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INTRODUCTION 
Disney and three other Hollywood studios (“Disney”) have sued VidAngel, a 
small Utah-based company that operates an online video streaming service designed 
to enable lawful owners of movies to filter out objectionable content before viewing 
those movies at home.  According to Disney, VidAngel is a copyright pirate that 
chooses to steal rather than “negotiate and pay for the rights they use.”  See 
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“MPAS”) at 1:22-23.  Like 
many of its movies, however, Disney’s story is pure fantasy. 
When that story is fully told, three things are clear: (1) VidAngel is no 
pirate.  It spent over a third of its capital contributions to buy DVD and Blu-ray 
discs sold by the studios and re-sells them to consumers, many of whom would not 
otherwise watch the movies recorded on them.  (2) Disney is no victim.  It is a bully 
that, acting in concert with other powerful companies, has long engaged in an 
unlawful effort to block any online filtering services for the at-home viewing of 
lawfully purchased movies.  And (3) this lawsuit is about filtering, not piracy.  It is 
an elegantly disguised attempt by Disney’s lawyers to accomplish what its lobbyists 
could not: obstruction of the Family Home Movie Act of 2005 (“FMA”). 
Currently before this court is Disney’s motion for a preliminary injunction 
seeking to shut down VidAngel’s operations pending resolution of this 
litigation.  That motion must be denied. 
It is well settled that a party seeking the “extraordinary remedy” of a 
preliminary injunction must “clearly show” that it is likely to succeed on the merits; 
that it will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; that the balance of equities 
tips in its favor; and that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).  Disney has not met—and cannot 
meet—its burden on any (let alone all four) of those factors. 
First, Disney cannot establish that any of its claims are likely to 
succeed.  VidAngel’s service is both legal and fair. 
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It is legal because nothing VidAngel does can reasonably be construed as 
infringement or circumvention under federal law.  Any possible confusion on that 
issue was conclusively resolved by Congress over a decade ago.  The FMA 
authorizes for-profit companies to stream lawfully purchased movies for home 
viewing with objectionable content filtered out pursuant to each customer’s 
individual choice.  Disney vigorously opposed the FMA.  They lost, but have 
continued their war against filtering by refusing to license any company ever to 
filter lawfully purchased content for home viewing.  Without apparent irony, Disney 
insists that VidAngel’s DVD-based business model is illegal, when it is Disney’s 
misconduct that has effectively made that model the only way in which FMA-
authorized filtering can be meaningfully made available to American families. 
VidAngel’s service is also fair.  Contrary to Disney’s intimations and 
accusations, every VidAngel customer must actually purchase a Disney movie 
before it is streamed for their home viewing.  If Disney’s view of the law were 
adopted, anyone who wanted to purchase and have a filtered movie streamed for 
home-viewing would be forced to pay Disney twice for that privilege: once for the 
DVD and once to watch it.  That’s unfair.  
Second, Disney cannot show that VidAngel’s continued operation pending 
trial would cause any irreparable harm.  After receiving letters from VidAngel in 
July and August of 2015, Disney (and all five other major studios) discussed 
VidAngel’s service for almost a year before Disney (but not three other major 
studios) elected to file this action.  Less than two weeks after receiving VidAngel’s 
first letter, Disney established a VidAngel account, and the major studios exchanged 
over 1,300 emails related to VidAngel in the ten-plus months before suit.  Disney 
then waited several more months before seeking to enjoin VidAngel’s service.   That 
is not how Big Hollywood responds to pirates, however small, and it is not how they 
react to those who traffic in DMCA circumvention technologies aimed at facilitating 
piracy.  In those cases, the studios have always acted quickly and in concert.  Here, 
Case 2:16-cv-04109-AB-PLA   Document 42   Filed 09/12/16   Page 11 of 44   Page ID #:1696
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
  
  -3-  
VIDANGEL’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
 
in contrast, Disney took a year, not to build a case against a pirate, but to decide how 
to neutralize an act of Congress.  Such extraordinary delay bars injunctive relief. 
Finally, Disney cannot prove that the balance of hardships tips decisively in 
its favor or that the public interest supports a preliminary injunction.  To the 
contrary, the balancing of hardships weighs strongly in favor of VidAngel, the only 
participant in a nascent market being suppressed by Disney.  Moreover, as 
evidenced by the half-million families it has already served, that market serves an 
important public interest recognized by Congress when it passed the FMA.  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This case is about filtering, not piracy.  And Disney is going to lose, because 
Congress said so.  Specifically, the FMA authorizes for-profit companies such as 
VidAngel to stream lawfully purchased movies for home viewing with objectionable 
content filtered out pursuant to each customer’s individual choice.  Disney and the 
other major studios vigorously opposed the FMA.  They lost, but have continued 
their war against filtering by .  
Declaration of Jaime Marquart (“Marquart Dec.”), Ex. B at Tr. 83:20-84:21.  That 
de facto ban has necessitated VidAngel’s DVD-based business model, which makes 
the filtering authorized by the FMA meaningfully available to American families.  
To correct the highly misleading narrative set forth by Disney, we begin with a brief 
summary of the relevant factual history. 
A. Prior to 2005, Disney Used Copyright Litigation to Prevent 
Customers Who Purchased Movies for Home Viewing From 
Filtering Objectionable Content. 
Before 2005, the motion picture studios sued every service that tried to 
provide filtered content to consumers.  H.R. REP. No. 109-33(1) at 7 (2005).   Like 
today, Disney and its allies attempted to use scorched-earth litigation tactics to bully 
smaller players.  As the House Judiciary Committee noted with some incredulity, 
Disney and its allies had sued companies lawfully providing filtering services under 
the pre-FMA legal regime: “Testimony provided by the Register on June 17, 2004, 
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makes clear that some parties to the suit should not face liability for their current 
actions.”  Id. at 5.  See also H.R. REP. No. 108-670, at 3 (2004) (“The Committee is 
. . . concerned that one service that has adopted a model that is already legal under 
existing law is embroiled in litigation.”).  The Committee also observed that if 
Disney and its allies had allowed the “airline and broadcast versions [of movies to] . 
. . be[] made available for sale to the public,” new legislation (which became the 
FMA) might not have been needed.  H.R. REP. No. 108-670, at 3 (2004).  
Indeed, it was precisely because Big Hollywood refused to acknowledge the 
moral rights of American families to filter objectionable content that Congress 
changed the law by enacting the FMA over 11 years ago. 
B. Congress Enacted the FMA to Ensure that Families Could Watch 
Filtered Content in Private 
There is no serious doubt concerning the purpose of the FMA.  It was enacted 
to ensure “that existing copyright and trademark law cannot be used to prevent a 
parent from deciding what their children see in the privacy of their own home” 
because Congress did “not take kindly to those who would presume to tell parents 
how they decide what is best for their children.”  150 CONG. REC. H7654-01 (Sept. 
24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).  Congress sought to “shield[] 
companies that make movie-filtering systems from liability for copyrighting 
infringement,” id., and “ensure” that technology that helps parents “determine what 
their children see on the screen” would “not face continued legal challenges.”  Id. 
(statement of Rep. Smith). 
Congress wanted to “allow for technology innovation to flourish without 
having to face continued legal challenges” and without “requir[ing] limits to be 
placed on content the studios develop.”  Id. (statement of Rep. Cannon).  At the 
same time, though, Congress wanted to allow other use of “available technology to 
skip over portions of a movie.”  151 CONG. REC. H2114-01 (Apr. 10, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).  It was “time for the rights of parents not to be 
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tied up in the courts any longer.”  Id.   
Congress believed strongly that families should be allowed to filter content 
shown at home.   The FMA’s House sponsor succinctly explained that need: 
Just as the author of a book should not be able to force someone to read 
that book in any particular manner or order, a studio or director should 
not be able to force our children to watch a movie in a particular 
way.  No one can argue with a straight face it should be against the law 
to skip over a few pages or even entire chapters of a book.  So, too, 
it should not be illegal to skip over a few words or scenes in a 
movie.  The Family Movie Act ensures that parents have such rights.  
150 CONG. REC. H7654-01 (Sept. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep. Lamar 
Smith).  Congressman Cannon observed that the FMA was intended to allow parents 
“to protect their children from the sex, violence, profanity and other objectionable 
materials that are found in movies” by “clarifying the exemption in the copyright 
infringement law allowing people to skip, mute or avoid scenes on DVDs.”  Id. 
As explained below, the legislative choices that Congress made in the FMA 
were directly intended to prevent studios or directors from using litigation to block 
parental filtering they disliked. 
C. Congress’s Decision to Authorize For-Profit Companies to Stream 
Lawfully Purchased Movies for Filtered Home Viewing Was 
Knowingly Made Over Disney’s Vigorous Opposition. 
Disney and all the major studies—as well as the Motion Picture Association 
of America (MPAA), and the Directors Guild of America (DGA)—fought intensely 
to prevent the passage of the FMA.  See, e.g., H.R. REP 109-33(1) at 70.  Their 
central grievance was the same as here, namely, that only Disney and its friends 
should have the right to make “editorial decisions” about movies.  The FMA was 
problematic because it stopped studios from invoking copyright law to block 
filtering they did not bless.  Id.   
As Disney’s Capitol Hill allies explained in a minority report reflecting the 
reason for Disney’s opposition to the FMA: “The issue in the debate [is] who should 
make editorial decisions about what movie content children see: parents or a for-
profit company,” H.R. REP. No. 109-33(1) at 69 (emphasis added).  The minority 
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report further noted that the FMA “does not require that filtering be done with the 
permission of the content creator or owner, but rather creates an exemption from 
copyright and trademark liability for filtering.”  Id. at 74 (emphasis added).  Indeed, 
Congresswoman Watson memorably complained that the FMA would “shield[] 
companies that make movie-filtering systems from liability for copyrighting 
infringements.”  Id.  Exactly. 
Then and now, Disney and its allies were and are motivated by the same goal: 
to prevent any parental filtering.1  For Disney, home-viewing was and is an all or 
nothing proposition: “[D]on’t let your children watch a movie unless you approve of 
the content of the entire movie.”  H.R. REP. No. 109-33(I) at 72. In Disney’s 
preferred world, parents’ only recourse should be to rely on its G, PG, PG-13, R, 
and NC-17 rating system, which according to Disney, “effectively enable[s] parents 
to steer their children away from movies they consider inappropriate.”  Id.2 
In the considered judgment of Congress, that view was an unacceptable insult 
to the right of parents to control content in their own home in accord with their 
constitutionally-protected values.  At the same time, Congress was acutely sensitive 
                                           
1 The inability to completely control what is filtered underlies several of Disney’s 
alleged “irreparable injuries.” See Cittadine Dec., ¶¶ 5, 15-17, 21-34.  If that were 
correct, Disney would be irreparably injured every time a movie-watcher closed his 
eyes to avoid seeing a scary scene.  
2 Of course, as the House Judiciary Committee wryly observed, Disney fails to 
assert the moral rights of movie directors when such is inconvenient to Disney: 
The Committee is aware of numerous motion pictures being edited for 
screen size, content, and time purposes with or without the director’s 
consent so that a motion picture can be displayed on the 48-3 aspect 
ratios of standard definition televisions, or an airplane with 
objectionable language remove, and on television channels in the 
traditional 90 or 120-minute time slots.  The Committee sees no 
difference between the impact upon the moral rights of directors of 
such modifications and someone wanting to prevent certain content 
from being displayed on their television. 
H.R. REP. No. 109-33(I) at 7.   
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to the prospect that the studios and directors might never license third parties to 
stream filtered content to consumers.  Accordingly, the FMA was drafted to permit 
third parties to filter without consent and without liability for intellectual property 
claims the studios and directors might assert.  
To that end, the FMA amended section 110 of the Copyright Act to provide 
that “the following are not infringements of copyright: . . . (11) the making 
imperceptible, by or at the direction of a member of a private household, of limited 
portions of audio or video content of a motion picture, during a performance . . . 
transmitted to that household for private home viewing, from an authorized copy of 
the motion picture . . . if no fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture is 
created . . . .”  17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (emphasis added).  The Lanham Act was 
similarly amended.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(3)(A). 
D. In Furtherance of Its Unlawful Agreements with the DGA, Disney 
Prohibits Filtering in All Streaming Licenses 
Disney and other MPAA member studios have entered into an agreement with 
the DGA (“DGA Agreement”) that prohibits all but very limited editing or cutting 
of their major motion pictures and does not allow any form of filtering under the 
FMA.  (Dkt. No. 11).   VidAngel has counter-complained against Disney for 
antitrust violations with respect to the DGA Agreement, alleging that the agreement 
is part of a concerted effort to prohibit the lawful provision of online filtering 
services pursuant to the FMA.  Id.   
Disney’s witness, Tedd Cittadine, admitted that  
  Marquart Dec., Ex. B at 
Tr. 83:20-84:21. He further admitted that  
 
  Marquart Dec., Ex B at Tr. 343:6-21.  That agreement prohibits the VOD 
provider from “mak[ing], or authoriz[ing] any others to make, any modifications, 
deletions, cuts, alterations or additions” in or to any of Disney’s titles sold by the 
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VOD provider.  Harmon Dec., ¶ 48; Quinto Dec., ¶¶ 2-4, Ex. A.  The terms of 
service of VOD providers likewise prevent users from filtering Disney titles they 
buy from a VOD provider.  Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 26, 29, 30, Exs. G & H.  To obviate this 
motion, VidAngel offered to enter into a standard VOD license agreement with 
Disney that allowed for filtering.  Harmon Dec., ¶ 59; Quinto Dec., ¶¶ 2-4.  Disney 
(i.e., each plaintiff in this litigation) refused to consider its offer.  Id.  The reason is 
simple.  Disney does not want the market for filtering its licensed VOD titles to 
exist. 
E. Unable to Obtain a License from Disney, VidAngel Has Developed 
an FMA Authorized Streaming Business Model That Enables 
Customers Who Purchase Movies for Home Viewing to Filter 
Objectionable Content. 
The Declarations of VidAngel’s CEO, Neal Harmon, and its technological 
expert, Dr. Sigurd Meldal, explain in detail how VidAngel lawfully acquires DVDs 
of Disney’s titles, sells those discs to its users, and then streams filtered versions of 
those titles to the lawful owners of those discs for private home viewing.  Harmon 
Dec., ¶¶ 20, 26, 61; Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 33-44.  The declarations provide much more 
detail on how the technology works, but the letters VidAngel sent to Disney and 
other studios well over a year ago explained its basic service quite succinctly: (1) 
VidAngel “purchases [a] disc for the customer and stores it in a physical vault;” (2) 
using  proprietary technology, it “streams” the contents of the disc to the customer 
in a filtered format chosen by the customer; then (3) it “re-purchase[s] the disc at a 
discount from the sale price. . .based on the length of time the customer has owned 
the disc.”  Harmon Dec., ¶ 22, Ex. B.  VidAngel has spent  
 to buy digital video discs and Blu-ray discs (collectively, “DVDs”) 
sold by the studios and re-sells them to consumers, many of whom would not 
otherwise watch the movies recorded on them.  Id., ¶ 63.  To date, VidAngel has 
spent over  to purchase content sold by the studios.  Id.  No fixed copy of 
an altered work is ever created.  Id.  This service complies with the FMA.   
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LEGAL STANDARD 
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 
right.”  Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.  Indeed, the remedy is appropriate only if the movant 
proves “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities 
tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.”  Id. at 20.   
When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a technology, as Disney does here, a court 
should exercise particularly great restraint.  As the Supreme Court observed in the 
seminal Sony Betamax case:  “[t]he judiciary’s reluctance to expand the protections 
afforded by copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring 
theme,” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984), and 
“it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited 
monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . to give the public appropriate access 
to their work product.”  Id. at 429.   
ARGUMENT 
I. DISNEY IS NOT LIKELY TO PREVAIL. 
Disney is not likely to prevail on either its first claim for relief, for Copyright 
infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4), or its second claim for relief, for violation of 
the DMCA 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).  Knowing that it cannot demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on its first and most important cause of action, for copyright 
infringement, Disney focuses first on its second, DMCA claim, in its moving papers.  
Not only does that argument put the cart before the horse, it reveals the inherent 
infirmity in Disney’s logic.  This Court’s analysis of the copyright infringement 
claims should shed light on the larger purpose of the DMCA, which was intended to 
protect against copyright infringement.   
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A. Disney Will Not Succeed on Its Reproduction and Public 
Performance Copyright Claims. 
In contending that VidAngel violates Disney’s exclusive rights to reproduce 
and publicly perform its copyrighted works, Disney ignores that it gave up certain 
rights, and the subsequent owners acquired other rights, when physical copies of 
Disney’s DVDs were lawfully sold in the market.  
Disney first argues that VidAngel’s intermediate copies violate its 
reproduction right, citing only case law in which a defendant acted unlawfully by 
making copies capable of being viewed by consumers.  But, the case law draws a 
clear distinction between unlawful copies, which can be viewed by consumers, and 
lawful “intermediate” copies, which cannot. VidAngel does not make any copy that 
a consumer could watch, even if given access to the relevant files.   After decrypting 
discs it owns, VidAngel creates intermediate files that are not capable of being 
watched.  (Intermediate files can be compared to computer source code, which is 
unusable until it has been compiled and converted into object code.)  VidAngel tags 
the files for over 80 types of content, breaks them into approximately 1,300 
fragments that contain no more than 10 seconds of content (and frequently less), 
encrypts those fragments, and stores them in a secure, access-controlled location in 
the cloud.  Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 33-38.  A consumer given access to the content at any 
point before his or her disc purchase and selection of filters would be unable to 
watch it.  Such intermediate copies are thus not “copies” as defined by the 
Copyright Act and, as a matter of law, do not give rise to infringement claims.  Sega 
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 997 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Entm’t, 
Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 1999); Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d 
811 (9th Cir. 2003).   
Moreover, the U.S. Copyright Office’s most recent triennial report to 
Congress noted that both legislative history and a Central District of California 
decision militated in favor of the creation of an exemption for making personal 
copies of discs one owns (a practice known as “format-shifting”) before concluding 
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that the policy judgments related to it “are complex and thus best left to Congress or 
the courts.”  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Docket No. 2014-07, EXEMPTION TO 
PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS SYSTEMS FOR 
ACCESS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES (2015).  Various courts have addressed the issue 
and noted that the owner of a disc may make a personal copy.  Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD 
Copy Control Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 942-43 (N.D. Cal. 2009); U.S. v. Elcom 
Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2002). And, here, Congress has spoken. 
Nor is the streaming of filtered copies to customers who have purchased 
DVDs a public performance.  The Supreme Court has declared that a transmission 
of a copyrighted program is not made to “the public” when it is made “to those who 
act as owners or possessors of the relevant product.”  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510 (2014).  Disney characterized that statement as dictum, 
but the Court took pains to craft a “limited holding” that would not discourage “the 
emergence or use of different kinds of technologies.”  Id.  It further suggested that 
the public service right is not be infringed when – as with a filtering service – “the 
user of a service pays primarily for something other than the transmission of 
copyrighted works . . . .”  Id. at 2511.  Because VidAngel streams filtered versions 
of motion pictures created at the direction of and owned by its customers, it is 
simply untrue that VidAngel engages in public performances. 
Disney’s argument requires the Court to find that Congress intended that 
consumers be charged twice to watch a movie once.   That is not the law.  The FMA 
requires that any consumer watching filtered content must first have lawfully 
purchased a copy (i.e., a DVD), thus ensuring that the studios receive a royalty 
payment.  Then, says Disney, the consumer must pay a separate streaming fee to 
watch that copy.  But nothing in the FMA suggests that Disney should be paid twice 
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when consumers watch a filtered movie once. 3  Indeed, that suggestion is especially 
absurd given that Disney does not even provide the filtering service.  
B. In Any Event, the FMA Shields Companies Like VidAngel From 
Liability Under any Provision of the Copyright Act. 
Even assuming Disney is likely to succeed on the merits of its reproduction 
and public performance claims, VidAngel has a strong FMA defense.  The FMA 
expressly provides that a third party may filter and transmit content as specified by a 
lawful owner of a copy so long as a fixed copy of the altered content is not created.  
VidAngel complies with those requirements.  Disney’s argument that VidAngel’s 
service necessarily violates its public performance right unless Disney chooses to 
grant a license to VidAngel would improperly give Disney a veto power over the 
FMA.  If accepted by the Court, Disney’s argument would render the first, and now 
most important, provision of the FMA (allowing a third party to filter and stream the 
content of a disc owned by a consumer) meaningless.  In actuality, Congress made 
filtering legal without the studios’ consent.   
 The FMA must be read to give it purpose.  As Judge Learned Hand observed, 
“it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence . . . to 
remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish.”  Cabell 
v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).  See also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 
397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its 
amendment to have real and substantial effect.”); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 
(2004) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so 
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .”); Corley v. 
                                           
3 Congress intended that the studios would be compensated only through the 
sale of copies of movies: “the bill would impose a private-sector mandate on 
copyright owners.  [It] would limit the right of copyright owners to collect 
compensation under copyright law from persons using or manufacturing a 
technology that enables making limited changes to a motion picture for a private 
home viewing.”  H.R. REP. No. 109-33(1) at 22; H.R. REP. No. 108-670, at 6 
(2004). 
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United States, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (same).   
Here, Congress enacted the FMA to provide a legislative solution to the 
studios’ refusal to cooperate with third parties seeking to satisfy consumer demand 
for filtered motion pictures.  Congress intended that “directors may not control 
every detail of how their works are displayed, particularly for a legal copy aired in 
the privacy of a consumer’s home.”  H.R. REP. No. 108-670, at 3 (2004).  To ensure 
that neither the studios nor the directors could deny the public the ability to enjoy 
filtered content in the privacy of their homes, the FMA “does not require that 
filtering be done with the permission of the content creator or owner, but rather 
creates an exemption from copyright and trademark liability for filtering.”  Id. at 
76.  Disney’s argument that a filtering service (like VidAngel) needs the identical 
permissions it would have needed before the FMA’s enactment would render this 
provision meaningless.   
VidAngel streams “authorized” (not bootlegged) copies of physical discs that 
it obtains on the legal market.  Harmon Dec., ¶ 20.  It is not required to obtain any 
further authorization from Disney to engage in its filtering service.  See 17 U.S.C. 
110(11); 150 CONG. REC. H7654-01 (Sept. 28, 2004) (“The making imperceptible 
must be ‘from an authorized copy of a motion picture.’  Thus, skipping and muting 
from an unauthorized to ‘bootleg’ copy of a motion picture would not be exempt.”) 
Disney does not dispute that VidAngel transmits filtered motion pictures for 
private home viewing at the direction of members of private households.  Nor can 
it.  Under the Copyright Act, “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance. . .is to communicate it 
by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place 
from which they are sent.”  17 U.S.C §101.  “This legislation contemplates that any 
altered performances of the motion picture would be made either directly by the 
viewer or at the direction of a viewer where the viewer is exercising substantial 
choice over the types of content they choose to skip or mute.” 150 CONG. REC. 
H7654-01 (Sept. 28, 2004).  That unquestionably occurs here, as VidAngel’s 
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customers select the filters that they wish to apply to each motion picture 
transmitted to them for private viewing in the home.  Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 37(b)(xi)-(xii). 
Tellingly, Disney’s papers ignore entirely the one case actually construing the 
FMA.4  In Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (MJW) (D. Colo. filed Aug. 
29, 2002), all the major studios counter complained against ClearPlay and 11 other 
small businesses (“ClearPlay”) that employed a variety of technologies to allow the 
public to watch filtered motion pictures.   Disney alleged that:  
[ClearPlay had found a] profitable business in providing to certain 
audiences, bowdlerized versions of other peoples’ movies.  Rather than 
go to the effort . . . of . . . producing . . . their own movies . . . they 
simply take the Studios’ movies and alter them without authorization 
by removing the material they think this audience will not want. 
Motion Picture Studio Def. Answer and Counterclaims, Huntsman v. 
Soderbergh,  No. 02-M-1662 (MJW), 2005 WL 1993421 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005), 
2002 WL 1993421, ¶ 23.  
ClearPlay offered edited versions “of the Hottest Movies.”  Id. at ¶ 62.  Its 
“editing service and software utilize[d] ’ClearPlay Filters’  and ‘ClearPlay Guides’ 
that [we]re created for each motion picture title.”  Id. at ¶ 63.  Disney alleged that 
ClearPlay “created, duplicated, rented, sold, or otherwise publicly distributed 
unlawfully edited” copies of movies (id. at ¶ 86) and that ClearPlay had additionally 
“created . . . film specific software files which, when used in conjunction with 
DVDs containing the Studios’ motion pictures, create unlawfully edited or 
otherwise altered versions of the Studios’ motion pictures.”  Id. at ¶ 115.  Like 
VidAngel’s technology, ClearPlay’s filtering technology did not create fixed copies 
of the filtered works.    
Because the action was still pending when the FMA took effect, the claims 
                                           
4 That omission could not have resulted from oversight in that 3 of the 4 
plaintiffs herein—Disney, Fox, and Warner Bros.—lost.  
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against ClearPlay had to be dismissed.  The court explained:  “the effect of the 
Family Movie Act is that Congress has made a policy decision that those who 
provide the technology to enable viewers to edit films for their private viewing 
should not be liable to the copyright owners for infringing their copyright 
protections or to the directors for the Lanham Act claims, and that removes this 
court’s jurisdiction over any further controversy. . . .”  2005 WL 1993421, at *2 
(emphasis added). 
The upshot is quite simple:  if a filtering service complies with the FMA, that 
service need not satisfy any other provisions of the Copyright Act: “The Committee 
strongly believes that subject to certain conditions, copyright and trademark law 
should not be used to limit a parent’s right to control what their children watch in 
the privacy of their own home.”  H.R. REP. No. 109-33(1) at 5.   
Those “certain conditions” were spelled out in the House Report (as well as in 
the text of the statute itself): “This new subsection ensures that U.S. copyright law 
does not prohibit . . . the use of any filtering service or technology that mutes or 
skips content, provided the service or technology:  1. ‘is confined to private, in-
home use; 2. ‘for the household of the purchasing consumer only; and 3. ‘does not 
create a fixed copy of the alternate version.”  Id. at 24 (emphasis added).  Further, 
“technology used to filter certain material out of movies for private viewing would 
not constitute a violation of copyright or trademark law.”  Id. at 21 (emphasis 
added).  The Report explained what was not exempted: “The Act does not create an 
exemption for actions that result in fixed copies of altered works.”  Id. at 7.   
Moreover, Disney’s argument that “VidAngel’s server copy segments are 
fixed because they are [allegedly] stored for more than a transitory duration” is 
legally and factually meritless.  MPAS at 22, fn. 11.  The term “fixed copy” in the 
FMA clearly is distinguishable from intermediate copies made incident to the 
filtering process, and it cannot be reasonably construed as prohibiting the creation of 
such copies.  See 17 U.S.C. § 110(11); Alvarez v. Tracy, 773 F.3d 1011, 1025 (9th 
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Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing the doctrine of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius).  Congress’ intent was to prohibit third parties from creating and 
selling a single fixed, altered version of a motion picture to the public at large: 
There is a basic distinction between a viewer choosing to alter what is 
visible or audible when viewing a film, the focus of this legislation, and 
a separate entity choosing to create and distribute a single, altered 
version to members of the public.  The section 110(11) exemption only 
applies to viewer directed changes to the viewing experience, and not 
the making or distribution of actual altered copies of the motion 
picture. 
150 CONG. REC. S11852-01 (Nov. 24, 2004); see also 150 CONG. REC. H7654-01 
(Sept. 24, 2004).     
C. VidAngel’s Service Does Not Violate the Copyright Act’s 
Anticircumvention Provisions Found in the DMCA. 
Disney contends that VidAngel circumvents access control measures in 
violation of § 1201(a)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).  This 
statutory provision was added to the Copyright Act as part of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”).  As such, Disney refers to VidAngel’s alleged violation 
of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) as its DMCA claim. 
The DMCA claim asserted by Disney is specious.  To be sure:  because 
Disney encrypts DVDs “to prevent unauthorized access to their content on Discs,” 
MPAS at 12:8-9, and VidAngel decrypts them, Disney’s argument has superficial 
appeal.  The argument, however, is based on a fundamental misapprehension of both 
the DMCA’s text and VidAngel’s service. 
Section 1201(a)(3)(A) of the Copyright Act expressly defines what it means 
“to circumvent a technological measure” as, inter alia, “to decrypt an encrypted 
work. . . without the authority of the copyright owner.”  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A).  
But VidAngel buys authorized copies of Disney’s DVDs.  Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 20, 61; 
Meldal Dec., ¶ 33.  And it sells them to its customers, who are able to view (with 
filtering) what they have purchased.  Id.  That is not circumvention. 
Contrary to Disney’s contention, the FMA legislative history does not evince 
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a clear intent to prohibit VidAngel from decrypting DVDs for the purpose of 
accessing a disk to filter audio and visual content.  That history merely shows that 
Congress was aware that “some copy protection technologies rely on matter placed 
into the audio or video signal” and the FMA “does not allow the skipping of 
technologies or other copy-protection-related matter for the purpose of defeating 
copy protection.”  150 CONG. REC. S11852-01 (Nov. 24, 2004) (emphasis 
added).  On the other hand, “it is expected that skipping and muting of content in the 
actual motion picture will be skipped or muted at the direction of the viewer based 
on that viewer’s desire to avoid seeing or hearing the action or sound in the motion 
picture.”  Id.  Thus, in balancing the legitimate interests of the viewer and the 
copyright holder, Congress expressed its intention that the FMA’s safe harbor not be 
misused for the purpose of thwarting “copy protection technologies.”  Id.   
At most, what VidAngel does could be considered as decrypting content for 
the purpose of allowing it to be viewed in another way, a procedure known as re-
formatting or “space shifting.”  VidAngel does so at the request of disc purchasers 
who elect to have their DVD content streamed to them rather than receiving the 
physical discs.  As former Solicitor General Don Verrilli assured the Supreme Court 
in Grokster while representing the major record labels and movie studios, his clients 
agreed that space shifting is legal.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480). 
Moreover, the DMCA should not be construed so broadly as to gut the FMA 
of its effectiveness.  It is undisputed that, when the FMA was enacted in April 2005, 
the only existing technology capable of allowing consumers to receive filtered 
content streamed to them required that DVDs be decrypted and intermediate copies 
be made.  Marquart Dec., Ex A at Tr. 79:7-80:24, 80:19-82:14; Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 19-
23.)  While Disney argues this is “irrelevant as a legal matter” (MPAS at 13:7), 
Congress surely did not intend to enact an impotent statute that would have no 
practical effect.  To the contrary, “[t]he plain meaning of [the FMA] exempts from 
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actions brought under U.S. copyright and trademark law the ‘making imperceptible 
. . . of limited portions of audio or video content provided no fixed copy is created.”  
H.R. REP 109-33(I) at 6-7 (emphasis added).  That exemption is limited only in that 
“[t]he Act does not create an exemption for actions that result in fixed copies of 
altered works.”  Id. The Chair of the House Judiciary Committee explained that, 
“this legislation, the Family Movie Act, clarifies that existing copyright and 
trademark law cannot be used to prevent a parent from utilizing available 
technology to skip over portions of a movie they may find objectionable.”  151 
CONG. REC. H2114-01 (Apr. 10, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
Tellingly, Disney defends its DMCA claim based principally on MDY 
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 952-55 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“MDY”).  But MDY simply did not turn on 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).  And, 
perhaps more importantly, the MDY court noted the tension between antitrust law 
and the doctrine of copyright misuse; indeed, it expressly cautioned against DMCA 
application when, as here, antitrust issues are present.  Id. at 951.5 
In any event, the remedies section of the DMCA portion of the Copyright Act 
makes clear that to redress violations, courts “may not impose a prior restraint on 
free speech,” 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1), which is essentially what Disney seeks, and 
courts should be especially wary of imposing such a restraint at a preliminary stage.  
Cf. Overstreet v. United Bros. of Carpenters and Joiners, 409 F.3d 1199, 1218 (9th 
Cir. 2005).  Even if this provision is ultimately (and incorrectly) found to support an 
award of damages, the DMCA ought not to serve as the basis for enjoining 
VidAngel’s service. 
                                           
5 The Court should act with restraint for the additional reason that the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation recently filed suit in the District of Columbia challenging the 
constitutionality of the precise DMCA provision, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), at 
issue herein.  Ex. A to Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Green v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Case No. 1:16-cv-01492-EGS, (D.D.C. filed on July 21, 2016).  
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D. Even if VidAngel Is in Technical Violation of the Law, Its Service 
Is a Protected Fair Use.  
If VidAngel’s service is found to be in technical violation of the FMA, it is 
nonetheless entitled to protection as a “fair use.”  As the Supreme Court recently 
explained, “[t]he ultimate goal of copyright is to expand public knowledge and 
understanding. . .. [W]hile authors are undoubtedly important intended beneficiaries 
of copyright, the ultimate, primary intended beneficiary is the public, whose access 
to knowledge copyright seeks to advance by providing rewards for authorship.”  
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S. 
Ct. 1658 (2016); see also Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 
(1994) (Fair Use furthers “copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.’”).  To determine whether a particular use of a work is fair, 
the factors considered: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether it 
is of a commercial nature6 or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of 
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.  Campbell at 576-77; 17 
U.S.C. § 107.  The Court should also consider the clear legislative intent to make 
filtering services such as VidAngel’s service available to the public and the public 
interest in allowing children to be protected from inappropriate content. 
1. VidAngel’s Service Is Highly Transformative.  
The central inquiry in evaluating the purpose and character of the use of a 
copyrighted work is to determine whether and to what extent the new work is 
“transformative.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. A work is “transformative” when it 
does not “merely supersede the objects of the original creation” but rather serves a 
                                           
6 Under the FMA, it is irrelevant that VidAngel is a for-profit business.  See H.R. 
REP. No. 109-33(1) at 69-74; 17 U.S.C. § 110(11). 
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new and different function.  Id.; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 
1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007).   
VidAngel’s filtering service transforms films that many people find offensive 
or inappropriate for children into family-friendly content as judged by each viewer.  
By its very nature, VidAngel’s service is transformative in that it alters the content 
of the works as seen by different viewers in different ways.  Each user is privately 
streamed a customized version of the work that no longer contains the content the 
viewer finds objectionable.  The vast majority of VidAngel users would not watch 
the content streamed to them without filters.  Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 37-40.  VidAngel 
makes the unwatchable watchable, thus furthering congressional intent to provide 
families with access to content they otherwise would not consume, and creates a 
new audience for the filtered works. VidAngel’s highly transformative service 
weighs heavily in favor of finding fair use.  
2. Plaintiffs’ Works Are Especially Amenable to Fair Use 
“Published works are more likely to qualify as fair use [than unpublished 
works] because the first appearance of the artist’s expression has already occurred.”  
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).   
VidAngel filters exclusively published works.  Because the copyright owner’s 
expression of those works occurs before VidAngel’s use, this factor favors fair use.  
3. VidAngel’s Users May Access Plaintiffs’ Works Only for  
Transformative Purposes 
In determining whether a use is fair, courts assess the amount and 
substantiality of the copyrighted work that is “made accessible to the public for 
which it may serve as a competing substitute.”  Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 221-222. 
VidAngel’s service allows individual users to control how much of a film is made 
imperceptible.  Each user is required to apply at least one (substantive) filter, and 
VidAngel’s system never allows the public to access any original, unaltered work.  
VidAngel’s data show that the overwhelming majority of users (96 percent) apply 
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multiple filters.  Harmon Dec., ¶ 37. Thus, the amount of Plaintiffs’ works made 
accessible is determined by each user and is always limited to the amount necessary 
to create that particular user’s desired filtered work.  VidAngel users never watch 
exact copies of the original films.  Moreover, VidAngel’s filtered content is not a 
substitute for Plaintiffs’ original works.  
4. VidAngel’s Lawful Filtering Service Increases Disney’s Disc 
Sales. 
The “single most important element of fair use” is the impact of the use on the 
traditional market for the copyrighted work.  Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1986).  To defeat a claim of fair use, the copyright 
holder must point to the market harms that result from secondary use substituting for 
the original work. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (“cognizable market harm” is 
limited to “market substitution”).  This factor “requires the Court to strike a balance 
between the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted and the personal 
gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied.” Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 667 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981)).  
VidAngel does not harm the market for unfiltered movies because filtered 
movies are not a substitute for them.  As a rule, VidAngel cannot offer filtered 
movies until after the unfiltered originals have been shown in theaters, released on 
collector’s edition discs, and streamed to audiences.  See Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 29-30.  
Because VidAngel does not make fixed copies of filtered works, it cannot compete 
in the pay or free television market.  VidAngel’s filtering service increases the 
market for Disney’s works.  Over 92 percent of VidAngel customers would not 
watch those movies without filtering.  Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 37-40.  VidAngel lawfully 
purchases thousands of discs to resell to these unique customers.  In fact, VidAngel 
has spent over one-third of its capital contributions -- $1,200,000 to date – to 
purchase discs.  Id., ¶ 61.  
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5. The Clean Flicks Fair Use Analysis Is Inapposite 
Disney’s reliance on Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 
2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) is inapposite because it was not decided under the FMA.  
Clean Flicks made fixed copies of edited films, which is expressly prohibited by the 
FMA.  Id. at 1240.  The FMA was also inapplicable because CleanFlicks, rather 
than its customers, decided what to filter.  Here, no fixed copy of the filtered work is 
ever made and each user chooses what to filter.  Accordingly, VidAngel’s service is 
clearly fair use to the extent it is not exempted by the FMA. 
II. DISNEY CANNOT DEMONSTRATE IRREPARABLE HARM. 
A. Disney’s Year-and-a-Quarter Delay Demonstrates That an 
Injunction Is Unnecessary to Prevent Immediate and Irreparable 
Harm. 
Disney relies heavily on Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. WTV Systems, 
824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2011), to support its irreparable harm argument. 
But in that case, the plaintiffs – who were represented by Disney’s counsel herein, 
Glenn Pomerantz and Kelly Klaus – brought suit against an online DVD rental 
service called Zediva within 18 days of Zediva’s launch. Even so, counsel took 
pains to explain their delay in seeking an injunction.7  Significantly, they alleged 
that because Zediva had 137 titles available for rent, it posed an imminent threat.  
By comparison, VidAngel had over 750 titles available when it notified 16 studios 
and networks, including Disney, of its service with not one but two letters in July 
and August of 2015.  VidAngel explained that it: (1) “purchases the DVD or Blu-ray 
disc for the customer and stores it in a physical vault;” (2) “streams” the contents of 
the disc to the customer in a filtered format chosen by the customer; and (3) then 
                                           
7 In WTV Systems, plaintiffs’ counsel submitted a declaration emphasizing the 
speed with which plaintiffs filed suit. RJN Ex. B.  When the parties stipulated to 
expedited discovery, the stipulation recited that the additional time required for 
discovery would not evidence any delay.  Here, however, the parties stipulated only 
that the continuance of the preliminary injunction hearing from October 24 to 
October 31, 2016, would not constitute evidence of delay. 
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“re-purchase[s] the disc at a discount from the sale price. . .based on the length of 
time the customer has owned the disc.”  Harmon Dec., ¶ 22, Ex. B. VidAngel added 
that it had grown from 43 to 4848 users in just under six months (a 10,000% growth 
rate) and wished to buy directly from studios “to scale its business.”  Id.  The letters 
invited Disney to access its service, ask questions, and express any objections.  
Notwithstanding that the harm alleged Disney alleges herein is the same as in WTV 
Systems, Disney took almost a year and a quarter longer to seek an injunction. 
Delay in requesting a preliminary injunction is inconsistent with a claim of 
irreparable harm.  Oakland Trib., Inc. v. Chron. Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (“long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of 
urgency and irreparable harm.”); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[A][3][c] (unreasonable delay can defeat irreparable 
injury and the delay “need not be great”).  Denying an unreasonably delayed request 
for injunctive relief furthers the purpose of such relief – to maintain the status quo.  
See, e.g., Citibank N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1985) (10-week delay 
following notice of infringement was unreasonable); Hanginout, Inc. v. Google, 
Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1132–33 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (seven-month delay in filing 
suit, and even more before seeking preliminary injunction, was inexcusable); Valeo 
Intell. Prop., Inc. v. Data Depth Corp., 368 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (W.D. Wash. 
2005) (three-month delay belied claims of irreparable harm). 
Disney seemingly learned of VidAngel in December 2014, when it apparently 
called provisions in its agreements with Google to Google’s attention, thus causing 
Google to alter the Chromecast technology to render VidAngel’s service 
unworkable.  Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 10-13.  Evidently to hide evidence of that, Plaintiffs 
refused to search for or produce any e-mail communications related to VidAngel 
sent before late July 2015.  Marquart Dec., Ex. E.  Disney’s further year-and-a-
quarter delay in scheduling a preliminary injunction hearing after receiving 
VidAngel’s July 2015 letter negates its claims of irreparable harm. After receiving 
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VidAngel’s first letter, Disney opened a VidAngel account on August 6, 2015.  
Harmon Dec., ¶ 22, Ex. C.  Also on August 6, 2015, 18 mostly legal employees of 
Plaintiffs and other MPAA studios and 7 MPAA lawyers exchanged e-mails and 
messages about VidAngel.  Marquart Dec., Ex. D.  On August 20, 2015, Plaintiffs e-
mailed renowned litigation counsel, Tom Nolan of Skadden Arps, about VidAngel.  
Id. On August 28, 2015, Plaintiffs e-mailed Kelly Klaus, Glen Pomerantz and 
Jonathan Blavin of Munger Tolles, about VidAngel.  Id.  In all, 59 employees of 
Plaintiffs, the MPAA, or other MPAA studios exchanged 124 messages concerning 
VidAngel in August 2015 alone.  Id.  Plaintiffs’ in-house counsel and outside 
counsel discussed VidAngel over 1,300 times by e-mail alone before filing suit.  Id. 
Yet, Plaintiffs failed to send any cease-and-desist letter or other objection to 
VidAngel prior to filing.  Harmon Dec., ¶ 22.  Their delay prejudiced VidAngel and 
it users.  Hundreds of thousands of families now rely on VidAngel’s filtering 
service, and VidAngel invested millions in its distribution model (and enriched 
Plaintiffs by doing so), in reliance upon the studios’ silence.  Harmon Dec., ¶ 30. 
The authority Disney cites to justify its delay is inapposite.  The primary case 
Disney quotes to explain its delay – Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1962 (2014) – did not involve a preliminary injunction and did not address 
irreparable harm.  At issue was whether asserting a laches defense precluded the 
issuance of a permanent injunction.  Particularly after eBay and Winter – which 
require a showing of imminent actual harm – Plaintiffs’ delay negates any claim of 
irreparable harm.8 
                                           
8 Disney will likely rely upon another case in which they were involved, 
American Broad. Cos., 2012 WL 3854042 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), in which delay of 
roughly one year was excused, but  only because defendant’s business relied on an 
untested technology perceived as not viable.  Further, (1) most of the delay occurred 
while Aereo operated in “stealth” mode before its public announcement; (2) when it 
finally announced itself, the plaintiffs were unsure whether Aereo was viable; (3) 
Aereo operated in an invitation only, beta-testing phase for much of the delay; (4) 
Aereo loomed large only after it announced the commercial launch of its service in 
(footnote continued) 
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B. Disney’s Alleged Harms Are Caused by the FMA, Not VidAngel.  
A plaintiff must also present evidence of actual harm suffered as a direct 
result of the defendant’s actions.  Fox Broadcasting Co.  v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 
905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013); 
see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2011) (Perfect 
10 did not prove a sufficient causal connection between irreparable harm to its 
business and Google’s search service).  If there is not a sufficient causal nexus 
between the alleged irreparable injury and the alleged wrongdoing, an injunction 
will not issue.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 748 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 
Perfect 10, 653 F.3d at 982); Bird-B-Gone, Inc. v. Bird Barrier Am., Inc., 2013 WL 
11730662, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2013). 
In Dish, Fox alleged that Dish’s “Autohop” service, which allowed 
subscribers to skip commercials in recorded Fox television shows, infringed.  905 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1095.  To ensure Autohop functioned properly, Dish made “quality 
assurance” (“QA”) copies of Fox’s shows.  Id.  Fox sought a preliminary injunction, 
arguing that the QA copies resulted in irreparable harm by causing a “loss of 
control” of Fox’s copyrights.  The court found that Fox did not establish irreparable 
harm caused by Dish.  Id at 1110.  It held that the alleged harms flowed from the 
non-infringing ad-skipping function the copies facilitated.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed: “[i]n refusing to enjoin Dish from creating these [QA] copies, the district 
court correctly concluded that the harms Fox identified—including ‘loss of control 
over its copyrighted works and loss of advertising revenue’—did not ‘flow from’ the 
quality assurance copies themselves, but from the entire Autohop program.”  Fox 
Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 747 F.3d at 1072.  It concluded, “the market harm 
                                           
New York City, one month before suit; and (5) Aereo admitted that it would not 
have changed its business plan if it had received a cease-and-desist letter and was 
gearing up for litigation. Id. at 28.  Here, VidAngel was publicly launched in July 
2015 and had considerably more subscribers than even Aereo had when ABC sued 
it. 
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that Fox and its amici allege results from the automatic commercial-skipping, not 
the recording of programs …..”  Id. at 1069. 
Here, legitimate filtering under the FMA, not infringement by VidAngel, 
causes the “harms” alleged by Disney.  First, Disney alleges harm to its right to 
control how, when and through which channels consumers view its works.  By 
definition, filtering under the FMA occurs without Disney’s consent, and Disney 
may not control how others view those works.  Second, Disney alleges that 
VidAngel undermines its ability to license unfiltered content for streaming, but the 
FMA does not require a license to stream filtered content.  Third, Disney claims 
VidAngel disrupts its ability to secure and protect its content, but the FMA allows 
the transmission of filtered content. Thus, Disney does not have any right to review 
and approve VidAngel’s service (which is very secure in any event).  Meldal Dec. 
¶¶ 34, 38-39.  Fourth, Disney argues that VidAngel could prevent the development 
of the online streaming market through inferior user-viewing experiences.  Again, 
the FMA allows filtered transmissions without Disney’s consent.  Moreover, 
VidAngel’s streaming service is independently rated as superior to Disney’s (and to 
that of any other third party streaming service).  Harmon Dec., ¶ 27.    
C. Disney’s Alleged Harms Are Speculative. 
Disney’s irreparable injury analysis depends on a premise invalidated by the 
Supreme Court: that a presumption of irreparable harm applies to copyright 
infringement claims.  See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 392-3; Flexible Lifeline Sys., 654 
F.3d at 995-996 (9th Cir. 2011); Dish Network, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (requiring 
an “independent showing” that plaintiff was likely to suffer irreparable harm).  A 
threatened loss of prospective customers, goodwill or reputation supports irreparable 
harm only if it is not speculative.  Rent-A-Center v. Canyon Television & Appliance 
Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991); Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Super. 
Ct., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claimed lost goodwill 
and “untold” customers as too speculative). 
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Disney’s “evidence” in support of its four alleged irreparable harms is 
supplied only by Tedd Cittadine who at his deposition could offer no evidence that 
VidAngel was actually causing any of the hypothetical harms to which he testified. 
VidAngel has provided its disc-based filtered streaming service since the beginning 
of 2015 and over 500,000 families have now used it.  Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 25, 30.  
Logic suggests that if any of the speculated harms were real, there would now be 
evidence of actual injury.  Yet, Cittadine had no evidence:  (1) of actual harm 
caused by VidAngel to Disney’s “control of its copyrights” (Marquart Dec., Ex. A at 
Tr. 196:8-13, 197:18-25); (2)  
 
 (3) that VidAngel undermined Disney’s ability to secure and 
protect its content online (id., Ex. A at Tr. 240:14-24); or (4) that VidAngel hindered 
Disney’s development of the on-demand streaming market through inferior user 
experiences.  Id. at 263:11-18.9  Cittadine also acknowledged that the four 
hypothetical “harms” existed when Disney received VidAngel’s July 2015 letter. 10   
Cittadine’s hypotheticals are based upon a false assumption that VidAngel is 
a copyright pirate, like the filing-sharing networks shut down by courts.  When 
                                           
9 Owing to the admission that Plaintiffs have no evidence of inferior viewer 
experience, Disney cites to the Ehler declaration, Ex. L, for the proposition that 
VidAngel’s social media pages reflect a few consumer complaints of “poor 
streaming quality.”  Exhibit L reflects just 9 complaints from January 2016 through 
July 2016.  In almost all the screen captures, VidAngel responds to the consumer 
issue and promises to quickly resolve it, which is not “evidence” of any widespread 
consumer issue with VidAngel.  To the contrary, VidAngel’s service is growing 
precisely because it provides a quality viewing experience.  Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 26-28. 
10 Cittadine admitted that Fox would have had the same concern about 
VidAngel’s security in July 2015 that it did in June 2016, when it applied for a 
preliminary injunction.  Marquart Dec., Ex. A at Tr. 245:18-246:21. Cittadine 
admitted that VidAngel offered to allow Fox to look at its security architecture in 
July of 2015.  Id. at 244:13-18.  Cittadine also admitted that he did not know 
whether Fox ever took VidAngel up on that offer (in fact, Fox did not).  Id. at 
244:25-245:7. 
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asked for Disney’s evidence that VidAngel was causing harm to its right to control 
its intellectual property, Cittadine referenced “piracy that costs our business billions 
of dollars.”  Marquart Dec., Ex. A at Tr. 195:19-23.  Cittadine stated that: (1) 
“piracy obviously encourages people to watch consumer content without paying for 
it” (id. at 198:17-19); (2) “piracy undermines our ability to try and build a legitimate 
marketplace” (id. at 199:9-12); and (3) piracy “challenges us when we’re trying to 
negotiate business deals with our clients.”  Id. at 200:16-20.     
Plaintiffs have now demonstrated that the claimed irreparable injuries are 
purely pretextual.  After Cittadine declared that VidAngel’s “out-of-stock” notices 
harmed Disney by creating a poor user experience (Cittadine Dec., at ¶¶  29-30), 
VidAngel offered to negotiate a reasonable license fee to stream filtered content in 
lieu of sending out-of-stock notices pending resolution of this action.  Quinto Dec., 
¶¶ 2-4 and Ex. A.  Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “my clients absolutely will not 
engage in any joint licensing discussions.”  Id., ¶ 3.  Counsel for VidAngel then 
offered to abandon its FMA exemption defense (and with it the requirement that 
consumers must purchase copies of discs) and instead pay a license fee to stream 
filtered content, noting that such arrangement would resolve Disney’s DMCA and 
infringement claims.11  Plaintiffs never responded to the offer.  Id., ¶ 4.  
D. Disney’s Alleged Harms Are Economic. 
Economic injury alone will not support a finding of irreparable harm because 
it can generally be remedied by money damages.  Pyro Spectaculars N., Inc. v. 
Souza, 861 F. Supp.2d 1079, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Rent-A-Center, 944 F.2d 
at 603).  A preliminary injunction is appropriate only if the record establishes that 
                                           
11 VidAngel’s counsel described the many reasons why VidAngel would prefer 
to license content for streaming from Plaintiffs rather than continue its current 
physical DVD-based model, including that the studios will someday stop selling 
DVDs and that movies are usually released for streaming prior to their DVD release, 
requiring VidAngel customers to wait for this content.  Quinto Dec., Ex. E. 
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the harm is not economic.  Id.  If a defendant in a copyright infringement action 
maintains accurate records from which damages can be calculated, the harms are not 
irreparable.  See Capitol Records v. Redigi, No. 1:12-cv-00095, Order Denying 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2012) and transcript of ruling 
on preliminary injunction.  RJN., Ex. C.  
In Dish, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11, the Central District denied a preliminary 
injunction because the damages were calculable.  Fox accused Dish of copying its 
programs, which could be purchased from services like iTunes, without paying for 
them.  The fact that “Fox has licensing agreements with other companies shows that 
the copies of Fox Programs have a market value that other companies already pay in 
exchange for the right to use the copies.”  Id. So too here.  The same VOD market is 
at issue and any damages are both economic and easily calculable.  The Ninth 
Circuit agreed that monetary damages could compensate Fox for the loss of its 
copies, reasoning that Fox’s existing VOD licenses could “at the very least” 
constitute a starting point or aid in calculating damages.  Fox Broad. Co., 747 F.3d 
at 1073.  It also found that the appropriate market to consider was that for Fox’s 
VOD licenses (iTunes, Hulu, etc.).  Id. at 1070, 1073. 
As in Dish and Redigi, the value of VidAngel’s sales can be calculated.  
VidAngel has records of every transaction – including purchase date, sell-back date, 
amount paid, and filters selected – for every title it has ever filtered and streamed.  
Harmon Dec., ¶ 62.  Thus, any damages caused by VidAngel are easily calculable.  
III. THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS WEIGHS AGAINST A 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 
If its service is enjoined, VidAngel, whose only business is providing the 
filtering service at issue, would suffer an unimaginable financial hardship that could 
impair its ability to defend this action before the merits are decided. Where there are 
no more than “serious questions going to the merits,” the moving party must show 
that “the balance of hardships tips sharply in [its] favor.”  All for the Wild Rockies v. 
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Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011); Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 
1072 (9th Cir. 2012).   
“In evaluating the balance of hardships a court must consider the impact 
granting or denying a motion for a preliminary injunction will have on the 
respective enterprises. Thus the relative size and strength of each enterprise may be 
pertinent to this inquiry.”  Int’l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 
827 (9th Cir. 1993).  When a larger, established corporation seeks a preliminary 
injunction against a start-up, courts consistently refuse to enjoin the start-up’s 
business operations.  See, e.g., LucasArts Entm't Co. v. Humongous Entm’t Co., 815 
F. Supp. 332, 338 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (refusing to enjoin “a start-up company with 
limited financial resources” because it “depends to a large extent on sales of its 
products to pay its employees and operating expenses” and its “customers may lose 
their trust and confidence in the young company’s ability to deliver goods on time”); 
OG Int’l, Ltd. v. Ubisoft Entm’t, No. C 11-04980 CRB, 2011 WL 5079552, at *11 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011); Ossur Holdings, Inc. v. Bellacure, Inc., No. C05-
1552JLR, 2005 WL 3434440, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2005). 
The hardships strongly favor VidAngel, which has but 20 full-time 
employees.   Harmon Dec., ¶ 63.  This injunction would prevent it from filtering any 
motion pictures owned or licensed by Disney, and would cast doubt on the legality 
of its entire business enterprise.  Additionally, VidAngel’s goodwill would be 
seriously damaged as customers could not reliably depend upon VidAngel to filter 
many popular motion pictures.  In contrast, Disney are four of the world’s largest 
movie studios and have “presented little evidence regarding the harm [they] 
allegedly [are] suffering, other than the harm presumptively caused by copyright 
infringement.”12  See Activant Sols., Inc. v. Wrenchead, Inc., No. C 03-3376 VRW, 
                                           
12 Plaintiffs do not attempt to balance the hardships, but dismiss VidAngel’s 
hardships as legally irrelevant based on the assumption that they have demonstrated 
(footnote continued) 
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2004 WL 1887529, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2004).   
IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST STRONGLY FAVORS ALLOWING 
FAMILIES TO USE VIDANGEL’S FILTERING SERVICE. 
“The public interest analysis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction 
requires [the court] to consider ‘whether there exists some critical public interest 
that would be injured by the grant of preliminary relief.’” Indep. Living Ctr. v. 
Maxwell–Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 659 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott 
Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  “If. . .the impact of an injunction 
reaches beyond the parties, carrying with it a potential for public consequences, the 
public interest will be relevant to whether the district court grants the preliminary 
injunction.” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 303 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
See also Sierra Forest Legacy, 577 F.3d at 1022 (“When deciding whether to issue a 
narrowly tailored injunction, district courts must assess the harms pertaining to 
injunctive relief in the context of that narrow injunction”). Further, when “an 
injunction is asked which will adversely affect a public interest ... the court may in 
the public interest withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the 
parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the plaintiff.”  Weinberger 
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312–13 (1982).    
A. The Supreme Court Has Repeatedly Protected the Public from 
Offensive Content. 
The courts and Congress have frequently protected families from offensive 
content while in the privacy of their homes.  The following are but a few 
examples.  In Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970), the 
                                           
a likelihood of success.  (Mot. at 31-32.)  That is not the case.  In any event, where, 
as here, the balance of hardships tips strongly in the defendant’s favor, the plaintiff 
is required to demonstrate a stronger likelihood of success on the merits. 
MacDonald v. Chicago Park Dist., 132 F.3d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1997).   
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Supreme Court upheld a statute allowing anyone who received material that he or 
she perceived as erotically arousing or sexually provocative to request that the 
Postmaster General order the sender not to send further mailings because there is no 
constitutional right to send unwanted materials into someone’s home.   It was 
irrelevant that the recipient could simply choose to throw the unwanted mail away: 
“[T]he asserted right of a mailer . . . stops at the outer boundary of every person’s 
domain.”  Id. at 738.  In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), the 
Court noted that “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too 
young to read,” id. at 749, and held that the FCC has the power to regulate indecent 
radio broadcasts.  Id. at 731, 738.  The Supreme Court also upheld the issuance of 
notices of liability to Fox Television Stations for permitting “fleeting” expletives 
during nationally broadcast awards shows (although a later decision excused the 
fines).  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.  502 (2009).  In Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Supreme Court noted that it has “repeatedly 
recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful 
materials.”  Id. at 875 (citing cases).  Of especial significance here, it noted that a 
less restrictive alternative to banning all indecent speech on the Internet would be to 
“require[e] that indecent material be ‘tagged’ in a way that facilitates parental 
control of material coming into their homes.”  Id. at 879.  
B. VidAngel Serves an Important Public Interest. 
The public interest in protecting every person’s right to watch filtered content 
in private would be severely undercut by the issuance of a preliminary injunction.  
Consumers are rapidly shifting their viewing preferences toward mobile devices, 
tablets, and SmartTVs.  VidAngel is the only entity that provides a filtering service 
under the FMA for those viewing methods.  Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 8, 24, Harmon Dec., ¶¶ 
52-53.  An injunction would affect the largest and fasting growing segment of 
filtered content viewers.  As reflected by the overwhelming support of countless 
families and community leaders, VidAngel serves an important public interest.  See 
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Declarations of Timothy F. Winter; Donna Rice Hughes; Harry Jackson; Connor 
Boyack; Matt Kibbe; David Bozell; L Brent Bozell III; David Barton; Gary Bauer; 
Gary Marx; George E. Roller; Patrick Trueman; Rebecca Hagelin; Rick Green; 
Andrea Lafferty; Theodore Baehr; Tim Barton; Bryan and Diane Schwartz; Bob 
Waliszwewski; and Tim Wildmon. 
An injunction would also reach far beyond the parties by destroying the 
market for filtered films.  See Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1139 (overturning a preliminary 
injunction in part because it “clearly reached non-parties and implicated issues of 
broader public concern that could have public consequences.”).  Moreover, due to 
Disney’s unreasonable delay in bringing its motion, over 500,000 families have used 
VidAngel’s service to provide family-friendly entertainment options.  Harmon Dec., 
¶ 30.  The Court should not end the public’s ability to watch filtered movies before a 
final determination of the parties’ rights.  See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312.  
V. ANY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE CONDITIONED ON THE POSTING 
OF A BOND OF NOT LESS THAN $50 MILLION. 
A preliminary injunction may issue “only if the movant gives security in an 
amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by 
any party wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”  F.R.C.P. § 65(c); Squaxin Island 
Tribe v. Washington, 781 F. 2d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1986).  A party that is wrongfully 
enjoined may be limited to the amount of the bond as its recovery.  Buddy Sys., Inc. 
v. Exer-Genie, Inc., 545 F. 2d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 1976).  Thus, “[w]hen setting the 
amount of security, district courts should err on the high side,” because “an error in 
the other direction produces irreparable injury.” Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott 
Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 888 (7th Cir. 2000).  In analogous circumstances, courts in this 
circuit typically require multi-million dollar bonds.13   
                                           
13 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) 
($5 million); MGM v. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1995) 
($6 million); see also Design Furnishings, Inc. v. Zen Path, LLC, 2010 WL 
(footnote continued) 
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VidAngel occupies a uniquely advantageous market position.  It developed its 
filter-and-stream technology just as consumer preferences were beginning to shift 
from viewing physical discs on a home television to streaming content on all sorts of 
devices.  Consumers increasingly want the freedom to watch content wherever they 
may be, on tablet, laptop, smart telephones, and other devices.   As consumer 
preferences involving digital technologies always do, the change in preference for 
streamed content is happening rapidly and will likely be complete in under three 
years.  VidAngel enjoys a unique market position as the only company currently 
streaming filtered content to customers.  (The only other content filtering service on 
the market sells devices that consumers may use at home to filter the content of 
physical DVDs being watched on a television set.)  As the sole company offering to 
provide filtered streaming content, VidAngel enjoys a significant head start over 
potential competitors in developing its technology, patenting its break-throughs, and 
increasing its know-how.  VidAngel would lose this enormous head start if it were 
enjoined.  Loss of market share, especially during a critical period in a company’s 
growth, is, of course, an irreparable injury.  See Credit Bureau Connection, Inc. v. 
Pardini, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2010).  Further, VidAngel owes a 
large portion of its success to the highly capable and competent employees and 
independent contractors it has attracted, trained, and retained.  Were VidAngel to be 
enjoined during the pendency of this action, it would lose all the advantages 
described above. 
The injunction threatens to put VidAngel out of business before any 
resolution on the merits and would cause it serious financial loss.  To date, 
                                           
5418893, at *9 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ($1 million); Topline Corp. v. 4273371 Canada, 
Inc., 2007 WL 2332471 at *15 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2007) ($1 million); 
Cybermedia, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
($1.6 million). 
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VidAngel has been capitalized with over $3.6 million.  Harmon Dec., ¶ 63.   
 
 
     
   
The devastating financial repercussions of an injunction also would severely 
hamper VidAngel’s ability to properly fund the litigation of its antitrust claims 
against the counterclaim defendants, which are well-funded and established giants in 
the entertainment industry.  Disney, the DGA, and others have entered into written 
agreements that are clearly designed to prohibit the lawful provision of online 
filtering services.  These agreements unreasonably restrain the market for licensed 
VOD filtered streaming.  An injunction would jeopardize the pursuit of these 
legitimate claims on behalf of this suppressed market.  Thus, VidAngel requests a 
bond of not less than $50,000,000. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above, Disney’s motion should be denied. 
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